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 A B S T R A C T  
A financial statement is a result of financial reporting that describes the results of an 
entity’s financial performance for a specified period. Financial statements can also 
cause managers in an entity to commit financial reporting fraud because they want 
to describe an excellent financial performance. This study aims to test fraud pentagon 
theory in detecting fraudulent financial reporting. More specifically, this study 
attempts to test the financial target, financial stability, external pressure, ineffective 
monitoring, nature of the industry, change in auditor, change in director, CEOs photo 
frequency, political connection, and company existence against fraudulence in the 
companies' financial reporting. These companies are classified in the LQ45 index on 
the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 2015-2017. It used 78 annual 
report data taken by a proportional random sampling based on the number of 
proportions in each sector of the company. The data were analyzed using multiple 
regression analysis. The results indicate that financial stability and CEO photo 
frequency can be used to detect fraudulence in financial reporting. However, financial 
targets, external pressure, ineffective monitoring, nature of the industry, changes in 
auditor, changes in director, political connection, and company existence cannot be 
used to detect fraudulence in financial reporting. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Laporan keuangan adalah hasil dari pelaporan keuangan yang dapat menggambarkan 
hasil kinerja keuangan suatu entitas selama satu periode. Laporan keuangan juga dapat 
menyebabkan manajer pada suatu entitas melakukan kecurangan pelaporan keuangan 
karena ingin menggambarkan kinerja keuangan yang baik. Penelitian ini bertujuan 
untuk menguji teori fraud pentagon dalam mendeteksi kecurangan pelaporan keuangan. 
Fokus penelitian ini adalah pengujian terhadap financial target, financial stability, 
external pressure, innefective monitoring, nature of industry, change in auditor, change 
in director, CEO's photo frequency, political connection dan company existence 
terhadap kecurangan pelaporan keuanganpada perusahaan yang terklasifikasi dalam 
LQ45 pada BEI selama periode 2015-2017. Penelitian ini menggunakan 78 data laporan 
tahunan yang diambil dengan proportional random sampling berdasarkan jumlah 
proporsi pada tiap sektor perusahaan. Analisis data menggunakan analisis regresi linear 
berganda. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa financial stability dan CEO's photo 
frequency berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kecurangan pelaporan keuangan. 
Sementara, financial target, external pressure, innefective monitoring, nature of 
industry, change in auditor, change in director, political connection dan company 




Indonesian Accountant Association or IAI (2015), in 
SAK No.1, states that financial reporting contains 
vital information concerning the entity's financial 
reporting. Kasmir (2016) also described that the 
objective of making financial is for the report to the 
stakeholders and management. Sudana (2019), more 
specifically, stated that the information in the 
financial report could be used by both the 
stakeholders as a basis for making a decision.  
Managers have their interest in presenting a 
good-look financial report though they can also 
manipulate it (Perols & Lougee, 2011; Ratmono, 
2017; Skousen, Smith, & Wright, 2009). They 
manipulate some information in financial reports in 
order that the report shows excellent financial 
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performance; in fact, the company is not in good 
condition. In this case, the managers commit fraud. 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, in a 
report to the nation (ACFE, 2016), stated that there 
are three kinds of fraudulence: corruption, asset 
misappropriation, and financial statement fraud. 
Also, it reveals a graph of fraud, which causes the 
most significant loss, as presented in Figure 1. The 
data in Figure 1 indicates that financial statement 
fraud is a type of fraud with the highest degree of 
losses compared to asset mis-appropriation and 
corruption. For that reason, this study focuses on 
financial statement fraud. 
 
 
Source: ACFE (2016) 
Figure 1 
Occupational Frauds Category – Median Loss 
 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE, 2016) also describes that in 2016, it was the 
most critical period of financial statement fraud 
compared to the year 2012 and 2014. Figure 2 shows 
the graph of the frequency of financial statement 
fraud. 
Figure 1 shows  that  the  frequency of financial 
statement fraud in 2016 was higher than that in 2012 
and 2014. As such, this study used the periods of 
2016, 2015, and 2017 as the before and after the year 
that report. The reason is that the increase in fraud 
frequency can be related to that in the previous year, 
and this can affect the following year. 
In Indonesia, fraudulent financial reporting 
cases also occur in the banking sector. An example is 
the fraud audit case at Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) 
Tapung Raya District, Kampar Regency, Riau, and 
the case is a fictitious transfer carried out by the unit 
head of Rp 1.6 billion. The chronology of the 
discovery of the fictitious transfer was revealed on 
February 23, 2015, when an internal inspection team 
from the BRI branch of Bangkinang conducted an 
inspection of the BRI Tapung unit to find transaction 
irregularities. The results of the examination show 
that there is a discrepancy for a balance sheet with 
unbalanced cash; this is due to a record of money 
transfer but not accompanied by the money. After 
further examination, the opening of a cash deposit 
was Rp. 1.6 billion. The money is transferred from 
BRI's Sand Pangaraian II unit to the BRI Tapung 
Raya unit. So the embezzlement case was reported 
to the police. In this case, the perpetrators were 
charged with Law No. 10 of 1998 concerning 
banking, the perpetrators were threatened with a 
sentence of 10 years in prison plus fines (Ningtyas, 
2015).  From this case, it can be seen that banking 
fraud occurred at the BRI Tapung Raya unit due to 
the embezzlement of money and recording of 
money transfers without money (Ningtyas, 2015). 
Fraud Pentagon explained the factors driving 
the company's fraud either in corruption, misuse of 
assets, or manipulation of the company's financial 
statements (Crowe, 2011). However, Ratmono et al. 
(2018) revealed that the pentagon fraud theory in 
Indonesia has not been generalized properly due to 
differences in social, political, cultural, and 
economic conditions. However, if applied, people 
can use this pentagon fraud theory as a medium to 
detect and even prevent fraud in company 
management. 
There are three driving elements for people to 
commit fraud, called the fraud triangle theory: 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization (Crowe, 
2011). The fraud triangle theory is developed into 
diamond fraud with the existence of a fourth 
element, namely capability. Crowe (2011) then 
developed a fraud pentagon theory, which is the 
development of the diamond fraud theory, by 
adding the fifth element, namely arrogance. It is 
because of the previous theories were deemed 
unable to be used in all situations. 
The first element is the pressure. It emphasizes 
the encouragement of management pressure to 
commit fraud (Singleton, 2010; Zahra, Priem, & 
Rasheed, 2005). Pressure for management can affect 
fraud in a financial statement, due to the pressure 
from financial targets. The management, in this case, 
tends to be pressured to meet investor expectations 
for presenting good financial statements. The 
pressure on management can also be pressure 
through the stability of the company's financial 
performance. In such a position, the management 
wants to save the company by presenting financial 
reports showing rapid growth and high 
profitability. 
The element of opportunity can be a motivator 
for committing fraud. Of course, the opportunity is 
possible for someone to commit fraud (Singleton, 
2010; Wilks & Zimbelman, 2004; Zahra et al., 2005). 
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An ineffective monitoring system can provoke acts 
of fraud against financial statements because they 
think that the existing laws are not so strict. The 
nature of the industry can also provide management 
with the opportunity to commit fraud. For example, 
management can be more freely manipulate 
accounts whose valuations use subjective judgment 
or estimation. 
The existence of rationalization can provide an 
impetus for fraud and consider fraud as the right or 
rational act (Singleton, 2010; Skousen et al., 2009). 
Change in Auditors can influence the rationalization 
of fraud because when there is a change of auditors 
or public accounting firms, there will be a transition 
period in the company. Therefore, management can 
rationalize the act of fraud.  
The element of capability or competence may 
also encourage fraud because there are competent 
human resources that understand well the 
company's condition. This experienced managers 
can take advantage of these conditions as 
opportunities to commit fraud (Kurnia & Anis, 2017; 
Zahra et al., 2005). Change in directors can also drive 
to commit fraud. When there is no change in 
directors in a long time, the directors in the office 
must understand all the conditions and problems 
experienced by the company. This board of directors 
certainly understands the company's condition. 
With its capabilities, it is easy for them to commit 
fraud. Therefore, when these directors have not been 
replaced for a long time, this Board of Directors 
certainly understands the company's conditions. 
Then, with their capabilities, they can easily commit 
fraud. 
The last element is arrogance, in which 
managers are arrogant or feeling superior. They feel 
that the company's policies and internal controls do 
not apply to management. They think that they are 
free from the company's policies and internal control 
(Kurnia & Anis, 2017; Zahra et al., 2005). The CEO 
photo frequency that is displayed on the financial 
statements can represent their arrogance or 
superiority because of their position in management 
(Bastomi, 2018; Habib & Hossain, 2013; Schrand & 
Zechman, 2012). Political connection to the CEOs 
can be a factor of committing fraud because having 
a close relationship with the government or the 
ruling party can maintain their position and 
reputation. For example, in a difficult circumstance, 
CEOs with political relations can use this 
relationship to maintain the company's value 
(Nurbaiti & Hanafi, 2017; Wang, Chen, Chin, & 
Zheng, 2017). The company’s existence is a driving 
force for committing fraud because of the 
management’s interests to maintain the company’s 
existence in public. They do it by developing the 
company’s performance through published 
financial statements. Therefore—in any condition—
the company will depend on its existence 
(Handayani, 2008).     
This research was to test the pentagon fraud 
theory as the detection of fraud in financial 
statements using financial targets, financial stability, 
and external pressure as the pressure element. This 
study used the effective monitoring and nature of 
the industry for the elements of opportunity. It also 
used changes in auditor for the rationalization 
element, change in directors for the capability 
element, and the CEO's photo frequency, political 
connection, as well as company existence for the 
arrogance element. 
This study attempts to provide benefits for 
education about the factors causing fraud in both the 
academic field and in practice. It can also be used for 
a suggestion of implementing internal control for the 
entity in decision making for the stakeholders. The 
stock index consists of 45 issuers with high liquidity 
levels after meeting the selection criteria (Sahamok, 
2009). In selecting the issuers to enter into the LQ45 
index, the re-searchers used liquidity and market 
capitalization, and the change in LQ45 shares was 
done every six months. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESES 
Agency Theory 
Anthony & Govindarajan (2007) define agency 
theory as a formal link between agents or parties 
with an interest in the budgeting process, for 
example, the directors of the company and the 
division manager. This theory emphasizes the 
design of performance measurement and rewards so 
that managers behave positively or favorably 
towards the company as a whole. The analysis in 
agency theory requires formal specification from the 
budgetter regarding his preferences and attitude to 
risk and confidence as well as statement about the 
situation, actions, and functions of the outcome. 
 
Fraud Triangle 
The concept of the fraud triangle originated from 
research conducted by Cressey (1953), arguing that 
fraud can be triggered by three factors such as trust 
violators, namely those who deny or violate the trust 
or trust entrusted to them. Cressey, specifically, 
discussed it caused violators to lose temptation at 
work. The three factors are pressure, opportunity, 
and rationalization (Figure 2). 









The concept of diamond fraud theory is a 
development of the theory of fraud triangle where 
in this theory the fourth element has been developed 
in the driving factor of fraud: the ability (capability). 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) argue that in fraud 
measures even push door there any chance with 
pressure and rationalization, but the players must 
have the ability to recognize the right opportunity as 
an opportunity and take advantage of such as the 
person doesn't have the ability being the right, and 
then, the possibility of fraud may happen smaller. 









Crowe, (2011) stated that fraud pentagon is a 
refinement of the fraud triangle, where there is a 
fifth element, namely arrogance. Crowe (2011) 
stated that there is a fifth element in fraud pentagon 
because the element in the fraud triangle and fraud 
diamond cannot be used in all situations. With the 
fifth element, namely arrogance, fraud pentagon can 
be used in all situations to detect fraud in the 
financial statements. In general, Crowe, (2011) 








Financial Statement Fraud 
Fraud on financial statements is known as 
fraudulent financial reporting is defined as a black 
law dictionary (Priantara, 2013). It is a report or 
statement that is untrue or is made carelessly 
without realizing or caring whether the report is true 
or false and intended to influence the people who 
use the report so that they suffer losses. Priantara 
(2013) also defined fraud according to ACFE, that it 
is a description or financial presentation of an 
organization that is intentionally wrong. It can be 
achieved through intentional misstatement or the 
removal of a value or disclosure in financial 
statements that aim to trick the users of financial 
statements re-search model based on the previous 




With a financial target, management must strive to 
make the company’s good performance by meeting 
the target or the company’s expectation towards 
financial performance they have determined.  In this 
case, fraud in the financial statements might occur if 
the company cannot meet the financial targets. In 
that, managers manipulate their financial statement 
so that they feel they achieve the target (Bawekes, 
Simanjuntak, & Daat, 2018; Dechow, Ge, Larson, & 
Sloan, 2011; Kurnia & Anis, 2017; Nurbaiti & Hanafi, 
2017; Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono, 2017).  
A study by Bawekes et al., (2018) and Kurnia & 
Anis, (2017) proved that financial targets proxied by 
return on assets (ROA) can affect the occurrence of 
fraud in the financial statements. Kirkos, Spathis, 
and Manolopoulos (2007) and Summers and 
Sweeney (1998) revealed that a higher ROA 
encourages financial fraud. Based on the above 
arguments, the hypothesis is stated as follows. 
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Figure 5: Research Model 
 
Financial Stability 
The company’s unstable condition can trigger fraud 
because of financial stability as a benchmark for 
company performance through stable financial 
growth. the company's financial condition is 
considered stable when the company can meet 
current and future needs and sudden or sudden 
needs. Therefore, managers will take various 
measures in order to make the company into stable 
condition (Bawekes et al., 2018; Kurnia & Anis, 2017; 
Nurbaiti & Hanafi, 2017; Wahyuni & 
Budiwitjaksono, 2017). 
Kurnia & Anis, (2017) proved that financial 
stability, proxied by a change in total assets, can 
affect the occurrence of fraud in financial statement. 
The higher the ratio of changes in assets, the greater 
the possibility of financial fraud through earnings 
manipulation. In other words, the more stable the 
asset, the less likely it is to commit financial fraud. 
This is done to show the company’s strong financial 
position. Hence, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 




Sometimes, management faces pressure from 
external parties to fulfill their obligations (Skousen 
et al., 2009). The existence of external pressure can 
trigger management to commit fraud because of the 
need to return the capital they obtained. a company 
can return their debts if their operational activities 
run continuously and do not experience losses 
(Ravisankar, Ravi, Rao, & Bose, 2011). If the 
company has a high leverage ratio, they have a large 
amount of debt and high credit risk. As such, fraud 
is used as a solution by manipulating the profits 
generated (Bawekes et al., 2018; Kurnia & Anis, 2017; 
Nurbaiti & Hanafi, 2017; Wahyuni & 
Budiwitjaksono, 2017). Kurnia and Anis (2017) 
proved that external pressure from creditors affects 
the occurrence of fraud in financial statements. 
Managers are motivated to increase profits to give 
the impression that the company' performance is 
good and is able to pay their debts. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 




The ineffective monitoring or supervision can 
trigger fraud. They feel given opportunities to do 
anything, including fraud. With ineffective 
supervision, it is the same as providing 
opportunities for committing fraud (Bawekes et al., 
2018; Kurnia & Anis, 2017; Nurbaiti & Hanafi, 2017; 
Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono, 2017). An ineffective 
monitoring system can lead to fraud against 
financial statements because managers may think 
that supervision or existing laws are not so strict and 
they think it good. The perpetrators can freely 
commit fraud without worrying that their actions 
will be detected (Robison & Santore, 2011; Singleton, 
2010). 
Bawekes et al., (2018) and Robison and Santore 
(2011) proved that ineffective monitoring has a 
positive effect on fraud because ineffective 
supervision can provide opportunities for 
committing fraud. Company managers manipulate 
financial statements because they are not monitored 
well (Rezaee, 2005; Schrand & Zechman, 2012). 
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Based on the above arguments, the hypothesis is 
stated as follows: 
 
H4: Ineffective monitoring can detect fraud on 
financial statements. 
 
Nature of the Industry  
The nature of the industry or company is the 
company’s nature. There is an estimate of 
uncollectible receivables or by the existence of 
budgeting, estimated or not appropriately counted 
(Bawekes et al., 2018; Kurnia & Anis, 2017; Nurbaiti 
& Hanafi, 2017; Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono, 2017). 
Summers and Sweeney (1998) stated that the 
valuation of accounts receivable is done subjectively 
related to determining uncollectible accounts 
receivable. However, due to the subjective 
valuation, there is the potential for management to 
use the account as a tool to manipulate financial 
statements. In that case, the perpetrators can use it 
to commit fraud. 
Bastomi (2018) proved that the nature of 
industry could influence the occurrence of fraud in 
financial statements due to subjective judgments in 
the valuation and determination of uncollectible 
receivables. Bastomi (2018) also proved that the 
nature of industry can influence the occurrence of 
fraud in financial statements due to subjective 
judgments in the valuation and determination of 
uncollectible receivables. 
 
H5: Nature of the industry can detect fraud on 
financial statements. 
 
Change in auditor  
When changing auditors, the company needs 
adjustments or transitional periods for the auditor 
and the company. At the time of the change of 
auditors, the company has reasons by rationalising 
for committing fraud. They do it by taking the 
absence of supervision or control from the auditor so 
that mistakes either intentionally or unintentionally 
can occur (Bawekes et al., 2018; Kurnia & Anis, 2017; 
Nurbaiti & Hanafi, 2017; Skousen et al., 2009). 
Summers and Sweeney (1998) and Skousen et al. 
(2009) stated that many financial frauds were 
perpetrated in the first two years of an auditor’s 
tenure.  
Bawekes et al., (2018) proved that the change in 
auditor can affect the occurrence of fraud in the 
financial statements. When there are changes in the 
auditor, the company has a transition period and 
stress period where management can rationalize the 
occurrence of fraud (Skousen et al., 2009). 
H6:  Change in auditors can detect fraud on financial 
statements. 
 
Change in Director  
Change of director is one of the factors that allows 
fraud because a director has very important 
information about the company that allows the 
director to commit fraud. Wolfe & Hermanson 
(2014) said that financial statement fraud could 
occur if done by the right people that understood the 
company's condition well because they could take 
advantage of the opportunities that exist. The 
perpetrators need the ability to carry out their 
fraudulent deeds. The director’s ability can increase 
when the directors serve for a long time in the 
company. The negative impact of this is that the 
board of directors increasingly understands the 
conditions of the company due to having a too long 
position. This allows for fraudulent financial 
statements in the company.  
Kurnia & Anis, (2017) proved that change in 
director affects fraud because directors who have 
long served can understand how they can commit 
fraud based on the information they have. Chen, 
Firth, Gao, and Rui (2006) stated that CEO tenure 
increased the incident of fraud. Based on the above 
arguments, the hypothesis can eb stated as follows: 
 
H7:  Change in director can detect fraud in financial 
statements. 
 
CEO Photo Frequency 
The CEOs photo frequency posted in the financial 
statements can indicate the CEO is not paying 
enough attention to the annual report and use the 
media to display its status (Bawekes et al., 2018; 
Kurnia & Anis, 2017; Nurbaiti & hanafi, 2017). CEOs 
intent to show to everyone the status and position in 
the company because they do not want to lose the 
status or position (Crowe, 2011). The number CEOs 
photo on the financial statements can reflect the 
arrogance of the CEOs. A high level of arrogance can 
induce fraud because with the arrogance and 
superiority of a CEO makes any internal control will 
not apply to him because of his status and position. 
According to Crowe (2011), there is also a possibility 
that the CEOs will do whatever they want to 
maintain their position. The number of CEOs photo 
in the annual report also reflects the ceos 
overconfidence (Habib & Hossain, 2013; Schrand & 
Zechman, 2012). Overconfident managers tend to 
engage in fraudulent financial reporting. 
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Bawekes et al., (2018) proved that the number 
of CEOs photos contained in the financial statements 
can affect fraud due to the high likelihood of the 
CEOs committing fraud in order to maintain their 
current position. Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
found that the combination of CEOs pay and photo 
in the annual report increased the probability of 
financial fraud made the CEOs. Referring to the 
above arguments, the hypothesis is stated as 
follows. 
 
H8: CEOs photo frequency can detect fraud in 
financial statements. 
 
Political Connection  
The existence of political connections can be 
beneficial because it is easier to get a loan. Chaney, 
Faccio, and Parsley (2011) stated that companies that 
have political relations are easier to get loans from 
banks, ease in terms of taxes, easier to get contracts 
from the government, and when experiencing 
financial distress, will be easier to be bailed out by 
the government compared to companies that are 
have no political relations (Bawekes et al., 2018; 
Kurnia & anis, 2017; Nurbaiti & Hanafi, 2017). 
Companies with CEOs having political 
connections tend to want to have good financial 
statements to maintain their reputation. They do it 
even by manipulating financial statements, as long 
as they maintain their reputation in the business. 
Chaney et al. (2011) and Kurnia & ANIS (2017) 
proved that political connections affect the 
occurrence of fraud because companies with CEOs 
having political connections tend to easily commit 
fraud. Nonetheless, Wang et al. (2017) provides 
evidence that political connections reduce the likeli-
hood that managers commit financial statement 
fraud. Based on the arguments above, the 
hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
 
H9: Political connections can detect fraud in 
financial statements. 
 
Company Existence  
Handayani (2008) stated that under any 
circumstances, the company continues to have 
dependence on existence and cannot be separated 
forever. The existence of a company can be a trigger 
for fraud because of the desire of management to 
maintain the existence of the company. Companies 
that have existed for a long time have top 
management with high arrogance. In order 
tomaintain their existence, management must strive 
for the company to have a good result through 
manipulation of financial statements. There-fore, 
there is a possibility that if a company with a high 
level of existence will commit financial statement 
fraud when its performance decreases or is not good 
enough to show its good performance and the 
company’s existence. The hypothesis, then, can be 
stated as follows: 
 
H10: Company existences can detect fruad in 
financial statements.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample and Sampling Technique 
This study used a proportional random sampling 
method by lottery for taking the sample (Sugiyono, 
2008). This study used proportional sampling be-
cause the sample is companies that consistently be-
long to the LQ 45 Index, consists of several sectors 
with the number of companies in each sector. 
 
Dependent Variables  
In this study, fraud on financial statements is meas-
ured using the Fraud score model or F-Score devel-
oped by Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, (2011) and 
Kurnia & Anis, (2017). The F-Score Model has two 
variable components, namely accrual quality and fi-
nancial performance. The following is the F-Score 
calculation.  
 
F-Score = Accrual Quality + Financial Performance  (1) 
 
Accrual quality is calculated using RSST Ac-
crual. Richardson in Kurnia & Anis, (2017) used 
working capital (WC), non-current operating 
(NCO), and financial accrual (FIN) and the asset 
component in the form of accruals. The calculation 
model is as follows. 
 
RSST Accrual = (∆𝐖𝐖𝐖𝐖+∆𝐍𝐍𝐖𝐖𝐍𝐍+∆𝐅𝐅𝐅𝐅𝐍𝐍)




WC  = (Current Assets - Cash - Short Term 
Investments) - (Current Liabilities - Short 
Term Debt). 
NCO  =  (Total Assets - Current Assets - Investment) 
- (Total Liabilities - Current Liabilities - 
Long Term Debt). 
FIN  = (Short-term investments + Long-term 
investments) - (Long-term debt + Short-
term debt). 
ATS  =  (First Aset Awal + Last Total Asset)/2  
 
Skousen et al. (2009) explained the calculation 
of financial performance as follows. 
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Financial Performance = Change in Receivable + 
Change in Inventories + Change in cash sales + 
Change in earnings. 
where:  
Change in receivable  = Δ Receivables/ Average 
Total Assets 
Change in Inventory  = Δ Inventory/ Average Total 
Assets 
Change in cash sales  = (Δ Sales / Sales (t)) – (Δ 
Receivables / Receivables (t))  
Change in earnings  = (Profit (t)/ Average Total 
Assets (t)) - (Profit (t-1)/Average Total Assets (t-1)) 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables are financial targets, fi-
nancial stability, external pressure, effective moni-
toring, nature of the industry, change in auditors, 
change in directors, CEO photos frequency, political 
connection, and company existence. The measure-
ment variables used are as follows:  
Financial Target (X1) 
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸 𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
 / 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
 (3) 
Financial Stability (X2) 
ACHANGE = (Total Asett – Total Asett-1) /Total Asett  (4) 
External Pressure (X3) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
(5) 
Ineffective Monitoring (X4) 
BDOUT= 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸
 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
(6) 
Nature of Industry (X5) 





Change in Auditor (X6) 
It is a dummy variable which equals 1 if there is a 
change in the public accounting firm, 0 otherwise. 
Change in Director (X7) 
It is a dummy variable which equals 1 if there is a 
change of director, 0 otherwise. 
CEO Photo Frequency (X8) 
This variable is measured based on the frequency of 
CEO photos in the financial statements. 
Political Connection (X9) 
It is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO or 
the board of commissioners have a political connec-
tion, 0 otherwise.  
The existence (X10) 
It is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the com-
pany has been established for ten years or more, 0 
otherwise. 
Population and Sample 
The population consists of companies classified in 
LQ45 during the period 2015-2017 or calculated 
from February 2015 to January 2018. It has 35 
companies from seven sectors. The sample was 




𝑛𝑛 = 25,926 
 𝑛𝑛 = 26 
where:  
n : Sample Size 
N : Population Size 
e : Tolerance for sampling errors or errors (e = 10%) 
After that, the sample was taken using Propor-
tional random sampling with a simple draw. The 
company provisions taken from each sector are as 
presented in Table 1. It indicates that the research 
sample consists of annual reports of 26 companies 
during 2015-2017, with the total number of 78 annual 
report data.
Table 1 
Calculation of Proportional Random Sampling 
Sectors Population (n/35) x 26 Sample 
Industries 8 5.9429 6 
Infrastructures, Utilities, and Transportation 3 2,2286 2 
Finance 5 3,7143 4 
Trades, Service, and Investment 5 3,7143 4 
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Minings 3 2,2286 2 
Agriculture 3 2,2286 2 
Property, Real Estate, and Building Construction 8 5,9429 6 
Total 35 26 26 
Data Analysis Method 
The analytical method is multiple linear regression analysis and the model is as follows: 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8 + β9X9 + β10X10 + e (9) 
Description:  
Y = Fraud in Financial Statement (F-SCORE) 
α = Constant  
β1-10 = Regression Coefficient  
X1 = Financial Target (ROA) 
X2 = Financial Stability (ACHANGE) 
X3 = External Pressure (LEVERAGE) 
X4 = Innefective Monitoring (BDOUT) 
X5 = Nature of Industry (RECRATIO) 
X6 = Change in Auditor (AUDCHANGE) 
X7 = Change in Dirrector (DIRCHANGE) 
X8 = CEO Photo Frequency (CEOPHOTO) 
X9 = Political Connection (POLCON) 
X10 = Company Existence (EXISTENCE) 
e = Error 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
There are 78 annual reports from 26 companies 
belonging to the LQ45 index in 2015-2017. They have 
fulfilled the classical assumption tests such as the 
Normality Test, Heteroscedasticity Test, 
Multicollinearity Test, Autocorrelation Test. The 
researchers did multiple linear regression tests with 
the F test for simultaneous or simultaneous 
hypothesis testing and multiple linear regression 
tests with the t-test for partial or separate hypothesis 




N Min Max Mean SD 
F-SCORE 78 -1.3900 1.2100 0.1497 0.3773 
ROA 78 0.0100 0.4600 0.1048 0.1063 
ACHANGE 78 -.01200 0.6200 -0.1209 0.1223 
LEVERAGE 78 0.0500 1.3000 0.5336 0.2420 
BDOUT 78 0.2900 0.8000 0.4407 0.1317 
RECRATIO 78 -4.6400 4.9500 0.0523 0.7888 
AUDCHANGE 78 0.0000 1.0000 0.1900 0.3970 
DIRCHANGE 78 0.0000 1.0000 0.3800 0.4900 
CEOPHOTO 78 3.0000 12.0000 7.5400 2.0620 
POLCON 78 0.0000 1.0000 0.4400 0.4990 
EXISTENCE 78 0.0000 1.0000 0.8800 0.3220 
Valid N (listwise) 78 
Table 2 shows that the F-Score as the dependent 
variable has an average of 0.1497. This figure shows 
that the company's normal F-Score is 0.1497. 
However, there are companies that get a high F-Score 
of 1.21 who get the lowest F-Score of -1.39. The 
independent variable of the financial target, 
measured by ROA, has an average of 0.1048 with a 
standard deviation of 0.10634. This figure shows that 
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the average profit obtained by the sample in the study 
period was 10.48%. Financial stability, measured 
using changes in assets (ACHANGE), has an average 
of 0.1209. This figure shows that there are around 
12.09% of total assets in the study sample has changed 
from the previous year.  
External pressure (LEV) has an average of 0.5336. 
This figure shows that the sample has an average debt 
level of 53.36%. Effective monitoring (BDOUT)) has 
an average of 0.4407. This figure shows that the 
average number of independent commissioners 
owned by the sample is 44.07% of the total number of 
the board of commissioners. The nature of the 
industry (RECRATIO) has an average of 0.523. This 
figure shows that the sample has an average 
receivables ratio of 52%. Change in auditor 
(AUDCHANGE) has an average of 0.19, which means 
there is a change of auditors of 19% in the sample. 
Change in director (DIRCHANGE) has an average of 
0.38. It means that the study sample has 38% who 
made changes in directors 
The frequency of CEOs photo (CEOPHOTO) has 
an average of 7.54, which means that they are an 
average of 7 to 8 appear in the annual report. Political 
Connection (POLCON) has an average of 0.44. It 
means that there are 44% of CEOs who have political 
connections. Company existence (EXISTENCE)) has 
an average of 0.88, which means that 88% of the 
sample has more than 20 years of age. Here are the 
results of multiple linear regression analysis testing 
with the F test (Simultaneous hypothesis testing) in 
Table 3. Table 3 shows that the significant level of 
0.001 (<0.05). Tt indicates that H0 is rejected, and H1 
is accepted, which means the regression model used 
in this study is suitable 
Table 3 
Results of Multiple Regression Analysis with F-test 
ANOVA  
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.6710 10 0.3670 3.37300 .0010b 
Residual 7.2930 67 0.1090 
Total 10.9640 77 
a. Dependent Variable: F-score
b. Predictors: (Constant), EXISTENCE, BDOUT, REC RATIO, POLITICAL CONNEC-
TION, AUDITOR CHANGE, CEO NUMBER, DIRECTOR CHANGE, LEV, ACHANGE, 
ROA 
The results of multiple linear regression analysis testing with the t-test is presented in Tabel 4. 
Tabel 4 
Result from Multiple Regression Analysis with t-test 
Model Coefficient t-value Sig. 
1 (Constant) -0.3550 -1.6070 0.1130 
ROA 0.3030 0.0560 0.9550 
ACHANGE 1.7020 4.0370 0.0000 
LEVERAGE 0.0190 0.0940 0.9250 
BDOUT -0.2640 -0.6760 0.5020 
RECRATIO 0.0190 0.3990 0.6910 
AUDCHANGE 0.0510 0.4710 0.6390 
DIRCHANGE 0.0760 0.9030 0.3700 
CEOPHOTO 0.0490 2.0130 0.0480 
POLCON 0.1260 1.3020 0.1970 
EXISTENCE -0.0670 -0.5340 0.5950 
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Financial Target and Financial Statement Fraud 
Financial Target, measured by ROA, has a coefficient 
of -0.3550 and a t-value of 0.056, with a significance 
level of 0.955 (> 0.05). Therefore, H1, which states that 
the financial target can be used to detect fraud on the 
financial statements, is rejected. This is in line with 
research by Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono (2017) and 
Nurbaiti & Hanafi (2017), stating that those financial 
targets have no significant effect on fraud in financial 
statements. 
This can occur because some of the targets or 
expectations of the company's performance have 
been achieved. Another cause is the absence of a 
significant influence on financial targets that are 
proxied by ROA because ROA is a portrait of the 
company's performance during one period. When the 
ROA of an entity in the previous year is high, it will 
trigger the company to increase ROA to show 
increased performance. By doing so, the company can 
create a substantial profit from proper asset 
management. Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono (2017) 
state that stock price is basically very related to the 
company's financial condition. If the company 
earning is high, the investor confidence is also high so 
that the stock price is also high. However, if ROA 
were low, investors would ignore ROA in full. 
Therefore, management is not interested in cheating 
on financial statements in the form of earnings 
manipulation. Another reason is ROA may not be the 
right proxy for a financial target. (Dechow et al., 2011) 
suggests using ROA changes as a proxy for a financial 
target. 
Financial Stability and Financial Statement Fraud  
Financial Target, measured by asset change 
(ACHANGE), has a coefficient of 1.7020 and a t-value 
of 4.037, with a significance level of 0.000 (<0.05). That 
is why H2 stating that financial stability can be used 
to detect fraud in the financial statements, is accepted. 
This result is in accordance with the study by 
Bawekes et al. (2018), stating that financial stability 
can be used to detect fraud on financial statements. 
This study used financial stability proxied by 
changes in assets to detect fraud in financial 
statements. The effect of financial stability in 
detecting fraud in financial statements can be due to 
the fact that most of the fraud occurs in order to meet 
some needs, in this case, is to reduce negative 
perceptions of unstable assets. A positive sign of the 
ACHANGE indicates that the higher the financial 
instability of a company, the higher the fraud in the 
financial statements. The unstable financial condition 
reflects the high business risks faced by the company. 
To reduce the negative perceptions of external parties 
to the condition of the company, company managers 
try to give a positive signal in the form of excellent 
earnings performance, and this is done by 
manipulating profits. This evidence is supported by 
research done by Kurnia & Anis (2017), stating that 
basically, the company's financial stability is used as 
a benchmark of company performance. 
External Pressure and Financial Statement Fraud 
External pressure, as shown in Table 4, has a 
coefficient of 0.0190 and a t-value of 0.094, with a 
significance level of 0.925 (> 0.05). Therefore, H3, 
which states that external pressure can be used to 
detect fraud on the financial statements, is rejected. 
The result is in line with that by Wahyuni & 
Budiwitjaksono (2017) and Nurbaiti & Hanafi (2017) 
that state that external pressure has no significant 
effect in detecting fraud on finan-cial statements. 
This refutes the hypothesis that external pressure 
occurs due to high financial leverage. A higher debt 
ra-tio does not motivate companies to manipulate 
financial statements to show excellent performance. 
As such, the cause of the absence of influence from the 
debt to fraud ratio on the financial statements is 
identified. The effect of the debt ratio is not so strong 
as to trigger fraud in the financial statements 
(Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono, 2017). In addition, 
Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono (2017) also revealed that 
many companies could pay off obligations and meet 
their needs with their own capital without using debt. 
Ineffective Monitoring and Financial Statement 
Fraud 
Effective monitoring has a coefficient of 0.2640 and a 
t-value is -0.676, with a significance level of 0.502 (> 
0.05). Therefore, H4, which states that ineffective 
monitoring can be used to detect fraud on financial 
statements, is rejected. This result is in line with that 
of the study Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono, (2017); 
Nurbaiti & Hanafi, (2017); Bawekes et al., (2018) 
stating that ineffective monitoring does not have a 
significant effect on fraud in financial statements. 
The result refutes the hypothesis that ineffective 
monitoring manifested in the presence of weak 
control or control can lead to fraud. It is also 
supported by that of the study Wahyuni & 
Budiwitjaksono (2017) which mentions the cause of 
the absence of significant influence on infective 
monitoring as proxied by independent 
commissioners is because it is not the independent 
board of commissioners that influences fraud on the 
financial statements, but it is the quality of the board 
of commissioners itself that affects the existence of 
fraud on the financial statements. In addition, the 
330 
existence of POJK No. 33/ POJK.04/ 2014 (OJK, 2014) 
regarding the existence of independent 
commissioners reduces the possibility of an 
opportunity to do suspicion the financial statements. 
Nature of Industry and Financial Statement Fraud  
The nature of the industry, as shown in Table 4, has a 
coefficient of 0.2640 and a t-value is 0.399, with a 
significance level of 0.691 (> 0.05). Therefore, H5 
stating the nature of the industry can be used to detect 
fraud on financial statements, is rejected. This result 
is in line with the results of the study Nurbaiti & 
Hanafi (2017); Bawekes et al. (2018), which states that 
the nature of the industry does not have a significant 
influence on fraud in financial statements. 
The result refutes the hypotheses that the level of 
uncollectible receivables is made with estimates or 
not calculated precisely (Wahyuni & Budiwitjaksono, 
2017), or the assessment of receivables is carried out 
appropriately subjective related to uncollectible 
receivables (Dechow et al., 2011; Summers & 
Sweeney, 1998). The reason for the absence of a 
significant influence on the nature of industry 
proxied by the ratio of receivables is due to many 
companies that collect uncollectible receivables 
according to the age and amount of the receivables. 
As such, they are unlikely to manipulating their 
receivable. The results of this study are consistent 
with Skousen et al. (2009) which states that changes in 
receivables cannot detect financial fraud. This implies 
that companies in the LQ 45 index do not do earnings 
management using discretion in the receivables 
policy 
Change in Auditor and Financial Statement Fraud 
Change in auditors has a coefficient of 0.0510 and a t-
value of 0.471, with a significance level of 0.639 (> 
0.05). Thus, H6 stating that change in auditor can be 
used to detect fraud on the financial statements is 
rejected. This is because there are not many 
companies that have replaced their audiences. The 
result refutes the hypothesis that fraud can occur 
during the transition of auditor changes because, at 
that time, there was a stressful period in the company 
(Kurnia & Anis, 2017).  
The hypothesis being rejected can be due to the 
fact that not many samples have experienced auditor 
changes (Bawekes et al., 2018). The reason the 
company did not change the external auditor was that 
it was possible that the auditor had previously agreed 
on the accounting practices and methods applied by 
the company, as well as companies that had 
understood the way each other worked. According to 
Kurnia & Anis (2017), the company did not change 
auditors because they felt the result of the audit 
opinion in the previous period was quite good and 
had a match in terms of the company's budgeted costs 
for audit purposes. On the contrary, the companies 
that make external audit changes were caused by the 
desire to change from non-big four public account 
firms to big four public account firms which have 
better quality. Therefore, auditor changes do not 
increase financial fraud by managers. 
Change in Director and Financial Statement Fraud 
Change in director has a coefficient of 0.0760 and a t-
value of 0.903, with a significance level of 0.370 (> 
0.05). Thus, H7, which states that change in director 
can be used to detect fraud on the financial 
statements, is rejected. This is also in line with that 
Nurbaiti & Hanafi (2017) and Bawekes et al. (2018), 
stating that change in director does not have a 
significant influence on fraud in financial statements. 
This study rejects the hypothesis that directors who 
have served for an extended period of time can have 
the ability or capability to commit fraud because of 
the information they have so that they can take 
advantage of existing opportunities (Wolfe & 
Hermanson, 2004). This insignificant effect may be 
due to the change of directors made in order to 
improve company performance. The newly 
appointed directors who are considered more 
compatible with the hope of contributing to the 
development and innovation of the company.  
COE Photo Frequency and Financial Statement 
Fraud  
The frequent number of CEO photo, as shown in 
Table 4, has a coefficient of 0.0490 and a t-value of 
2.013, with a significance level of 0.048 (<0.05). Thus, 
H8 stating that the frequent number of CEOs that can 
be used to detect fraud on financial statements is 
accepted. The result of this study is in accordance 
with the study by Bawekes et al. (2018), stating that 
the frequent number of CEOs can be used to detect 
fraud in financial statements.  
The result of this study accepts the hypothesis 
that the frequent number of CEOs influences fraud in 
financial statements. The number of CEO photos 
posted in the annual report reflects the arrogance of 
the CEO. This high arrogance and superiority make 
CEOs feel that any internal control will not apply to 
them because their status and position make it easy 
for them to commit fraud. Bawekes et al. (2018), the 
CEO commits fraud in order to maintain his position. 
The number of CEOs photo in the annual report also 
reflects the CEOs over-confidence (Habib & Hossain, 
2013; Schrand & Zechman, 2012). Overconfident 
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managers tend to engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting. 
Political Connection and Financial Statement Fraud 
Political Connection has a coefficient of 0.1260 and a 
t-value of 1.302, with a significance level of 0.197 (> 
0.05). Therefore, H9, which states political 
connections can be used to detect fraud on financial 
statements, is rejected. This result is in line with 
research Kurnia & Anis (2017), stating that political 
connections do not have a significant effect on fraud 
on financial statements. 
The result rejects the hypothesis stating that 
companies with CEOs or directors who have political 
connections desire good financial reports to maintain 
their reputation and position.  It is part of the 
company's political connections obtained from the 
company's status in the form of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Therefore, the sample companies 
have a sound system so that there is no need to 
maintain the directors’ reputation with manipulates 
their financial statements. According to Nurbaiti & 
Hanafi (2017), political connections can be said that 
the CEO with these political connections does not 
utilize his political connections in the framework of 
managing the company. Kurnia & Anis (2017), stated 
that CEOs who have political connections do not 
include their positions in the political field in the 
annual report. In addition, CEOs who have political 
connections can reduce their arrogance. Therefore, it 
does not have an effect on fraud on the financial 
statements. 
Company Existence and Financial Statement Fraud 
Company Existence has a coefficient of -0.0670 and a 
t-value of -0.534, with a significance level of 0.595 (> 
0.05). Therefore, H10 stating that company existence 
can be used to detect fraud in financial reports is 
reject-ed. It is due to the absence of a significant 
influence on company existence. Almost all 
companies in this study have been established for 
more than 20 years, which means they have a good 
experience so that with the long-standing, the 
company can be said to have had an existence that is 
quite high among the people. Therefore, without 
cheating on any financial statements, the company 
already has a high existence among the public. 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
The results of the study provide evidence related to 
the prediction of whether all the variables are able to 
affect the fraud in financial statements. These factors 
are such as financial targets, external pressure, 
effective monitoring, nature of the industry, change 
in auditor, change in director, political connection, 
and company existence in which they cannot be 
used to detect fraud on financial statements. 
However, financial stability and the number of CEO 
photos can be used to detect fraud on the financial 
statements. Financial stability can affect financial 
statement fraud. As an element of pressure from 
fraud pentagon, the company's high financial 
instability can lead to fraudulent financial 
statements. The unstable financial conditions can 
encourage managers to take actions that can bring 
the company in a stable condition. In this case, the 
company needs to pay attention to their financial 
stability. The number of CEO photos can affect 
financial statement fraud. As part of the arrogance 
element of pentagon fraud, many CEO profiles 
listed in the annual report will provide an incentive 
for the CEO not to lose his status or position in the 
company's structure. With his high position, they 
give superior power in making decisions. A large 
number of CEOs have power, and their profile listed 
in the annual report arrogance can increase the 
CEO's desire to have excellent performance in the 
annual report by using their power. 
The results of this study can be used as input for 
internal controllers for considering when evaluating 
the company’s performance. The financial stability 
and frequent number of CEOs can affect fraud. 
Internal auditors, external auditors, investors, and 
regulators can be used to detect fraud in the financial 
statements. Meanwhile, this study can also be used 
by stakeholders as a material consideration in 
decision making in order to be more careful in 
making decisions regarding the appointment of 
CEOs. 
This study has several limitations, namely the 
data used were secondary data obtained from 
financial reports and annual reports. The data might 
have a possibility of errors in the management of 
data sources caused by system errors or human 
errors. The sample data used in the research were 
only from the Indonesia Stock Exchange without 
going through a direct survey on the sample. 
Therefore, the truth of the data used cannot be 
verified. Future research should develop better 
variables and proxies of financial fraud so that the 
research scope can be much more comprehensive. 
Future studies can also use a sample of the 
company's financial statements or annual reports 
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